Colin Williams

I am a fifth-year PhD candidate in economics at the University of Virginia. My research in urban and public economics examines how state and federal policies affect local governments and the interactions between local fiscal and land use policies. You can find my CV here, or you can read about my current projects below.

I am available by email at williams.colinandrew@gmail.com.

Working Papers and Work in Progress

The average size of new single-family homes grew by over 40% between 1985 and 2014. I argue that this trend is explained by land use regulations which act as fixed costs for developers. Because small homes are relatively less profitable, increasing regulation differentially affects the development decision, increasing the average size of the remaining projects. Using variation in fixed costs from development impact fees, I confirm these predictions and find that fees alone can explain roughly 15% of the increase in average sizes over the period. State Law, Local Finances, and Housing Markets: The Uneven Effects of Flat Fees (2025 SEA slides)

We use granular geolocation data and multiple empirical strategies to document that congestion is a pervasive feature of brick-and-mortar retail. Retailers do not adjust prices to reduce congestion. Instead, they invest in extra capacity in order to meet demand during the busiest periods, furthering urban sprawl. Retailer Congestion and The Timing of Transfer Payments with Yooseon Hwang

States impose earmarking requirements on local governments that restrict how revenue from certain taxes can be spent. I show that such earmarks are highly effective at raising spending on the designated category even when earmarked revenues are small, violating standard models of government and voter behavior that assume tax revenues are fungible. I argue that bargaining between government agencies is responsible for the effectiveness of earmarks. In support of this theory, I show that earmarks have the largest effects in large, county governments with greater scope for conflict between interest groups. When Can Government Regulate Itself? Tax Earmarks and the Composition of Government Spending